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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
78-2-2(3)(j) and Sec. 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from Summary Judgment entered against 
Steven K. Maxfield (Maxfield) Appellant, by the Third District 
Court, State of Utah, in favor of the Hi-Country Estate 
Homeowners Association, a Utah corporation, (Association), 
Appellee. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the prior trial before the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
in the case of Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, et al, 
Case No C-81-8560, res judicata and/or collateral estoppel 
precluding Judge Hanson from entering Summary Judgment? 
2. Was "equitable servitude11 a proper legal basis for 
granting Summary Judgment rather than quantum meruit (unjust 
enrichment)? 
3. Was the granting of the Association's Motion for Summary 
Judgment improper and prejudicial error, in that, there was no 
basis for attorney's fees either in contract or by statute and 
there existed genuine issues of material fact as to the 
reasonablness and necessity of assessments? 
1 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
This case is governed by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
The Association obtained judgment in Fifth Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County, Sandy Department, Small Claims Division against 
Steven K. Maxfield, ("Maxfield") for an annual homeowners 
assessment of One Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115.00) per year 
for upkeep of roads, utilities and general administration. (R.2, 
8). Maxfield appealed to the Third District Court. (R.4). The 
parties then stipulated that Maxfield's case and several other 
Homeowner's appeals could be consolidated and assigned to the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, C84-5500. (R.13). The Association 
would file a new complaint as though initially filed in the 
District Court and the action would, in all respects, be treated 
as initially filed in District Court. (R.14). Thereafter, the 
Association filed a new complaint against the Homeowners 
including Maxfield seeking (1) Declaratory judgment (2) Account 
Stated (3) Quantum Meruit and (4) Open Account. (R.15, 17, 18, 
19, 20). The District Court, by Order dated March 12, 1986, 
approved the stipulation and allowed the action to be 
consolidated and initially filed. (R.23,24). 
Maxfield answered and counterclaimed and, among other 
things, alleged that Judge Daniels, in a prior action, Richard L. 
James, et al, v. John W. Davies, C81-8560 (in which action 
Maxfield was also a Plaintiff), after trial, held that an 
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amendment to the restrictive covenants (Add. B) which required 
Homeowners to be members of the Association and allowed the 
Association to assess Homeowners (Maxfield) was void and 
unenforceable. (R.31 Para. 5, R.32 Para. 6, R.33 Para. 14, Add. 
A). 
The District Court ordered the parties to submit uncontested 
and contested of facts and brief the legal issues. (R.269, 270). 
The District Court on October 9, 1987, after argument ruled, 
that if there was a basis for levy, the case was resolved and if 
not the matter would go to trial on the claim of unjust 
enrichment. (R.380). The lower Court by Memorandum Decision, 
dated November 17, 1987, ruled on the disputed legal issues and 
found that the Davis case (supra) did not constitute collateral 
estoppel and/or res judicata that would prohibit the Plaintiff 
(Association) from levying assessments and the principal of 
"equitable servitude" applies entitling the Association to make 
reasonable assessments even if the original covenants and 
purposes of the Association did not allow such assessments. 
(R.382, 383). 
On November 3, 1988, the lower court entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of the Association against Maxfield in the 
principle amount of One Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven 
Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents ($1,177.99), costs of Twelve 
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($12.50) for a total judgment of One 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety Dollars and Forty Nine Cents 
($1,190.49) with legal interest and attorney's fees of Three 
3 
Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Dollars ($3,2 60.00) jointly and 
severally among all Defendants. (R.473, 474). 
Maxfield made motions under Rules 59 and 60 U.R.C.P. seeking 
to amend the judgment and for relief from the judgment which were 
denied on March 24, 1989. (R.503, 504, 514, 515). 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
Maxfield is a homeowner in Hi-Country Estates, a subdivision 
that was begun in 1969 or 1970. (R.82). 
The developer initially drafted restrictive covenants 
covering the subdivision in 1970. (R.318). These restrictive 
covenants dealt only with the types of uses and structures in 
connection with the lots and made no provision for a homeowner's 
association, maintenance of common areas, assessments and 
collection of assessments. (R.312-318, Ex. C). 
Since the first covenants did not deal at all with the 
Association, an amendment to the covenants was drafted in 1973 
which provided for a homeowner's association, maintenance of 
common areas, assessments and their enforcement. (R.3 74, Ex. A, 
Add. B). The original restrictive covenants and the amendment 
were both recorded on March 22, 1974. (R.90). Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowner's Association filed Articles of Incorporation on May 
17, 1973 and the Certificate of Incorporation was issued by the 
State of Utah on January 5, 1974. (R.360). 
For several years things were tranquil between the lot 
owners and the Association. Control of the Association rotated 
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among the membership. Beginning in 1980, however, a group of 
property owners obtained proxies from owners of undeveloped lots 
and seized control. Exercising their control, and over the loud 
protests of many lot owners, they began a vigorous program of 
suing lot owners, at association expense, to force compliance 
with the restrictive covenants. Again over loud protests of some 
lot owners, the controlling members appeared at planning and 
zoning hearings in a representative capacity for all residents 
within the subdivision. At the annual meeting in 1983, the 
protestors claimed that these actions were beyond the authority 
granted in the restrictive covenants and the grant of power in 
the Articles of the Association. The protestors demanded that 
such actions stop and when the controlling members, exercising 
their captive proxies, refused, the protestors, including 
Maxfield, (as Plaintiff in the prior action) initiated suit in 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, assigned to the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, entitled Richard L. James, et al v> John 
W» Davies, et al. Case No.C81-8560. (R.360). 
At trial, extensive materials and testimony were introduced 
tracing the development of the subdivision and the role played by 
the Association in that development. A central issue of that 
case was the source and scope of the authority of the 
Association. After a lengthy trial, Judge Daniels, on February 
17, 1984, ruled that the amendment to the protective covenants 
(R. 374 Ex. A, Add. A pg. 2 1. 18-25) that created the 
Association, were void and unenforceable and, therefore, there 
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was no lawfully constituted Association. Judge Daniels ruled 
that the amendment was not properly enacted because it was before 
the expiration of the term of the original restrictive covenants 
in 1995 and the amendment lacked the consent of the equitable 
owners of the property. (Emphasis added) (R.351, Add. A, pg. 2 
1.20-25). Judge Daniels also ruled that the directors of the 
Association acted in an ultra vires manner (sic) in attempting to 
enforce the restrictive covenants. (R.352, Add. Af pg. 3 1.14-
15) . 
No appeal was taken by the parties to the judgment and 
findings of Judge Daniels. (R.339, 346) . The Association 
nevertheless, continued to levy assessments and bring claims 
against delinquent lot owners in small claims court although it 
had no legal authority to do so. (R.5). Maxfield refused to pay 
assessments; refused to be a member of the illegally formed 
association; refused the services of the association and denied 
liability for payment of assessment consistent with Judge 
Daniel's ruling. (R.86, 87). 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment is a harsh remedy which should only be 
employed in cases where there clearly is no genuine issue of 
material fact which should go to trial by the trier of fact. 
Because of its harsh result, it should be employed cautiously by 
the court and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party 
moved against, in this case, Maxfield. 
Judge Hanson erred by failing to find res judicata and/or 
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collateral estoppel as a complete bar to the Association's cause 
of action against Maxfield based upon the prior trial before 
Judge Daniels in James v. Davies, C-81-8560 and his ruling that 
the Association had no right to assess or collect assessments 
against the homeowners and Maxfield had a right based upon that 
ruling to disassociate himself from the Association and refuse 
its services. 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment on the theory of 
"equitable servitude" which has no application in this case where 
the Association is attempting to assess and levy assessments 
against homeowners. Equitable servitude is a restriction or 
easement against real property which effects its use or gives 
another certain rights to it based in equity. Davies, C81-8560 
and his ruling that the Association had no right to assess or 
collect assessments against the homeowners and Maxfield had a 
right based upon that ruling to disassociate himself from the 
Association and refuse its services. 
Even if the trial judge properly applied the "equitable 
servitude" theory there is no legal basis for attorneys fees and 
a trial would have been necessitated to determine whether the 
assessments against Maxfield were reasonable and necessary. 
POINT I 
THE PRIOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, C81-
8560, WAS RES JUDICATA AND/OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
PRECLUDING JUDGE HANSON FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In Searle Bros, v. Searlef 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), at 690, 
the Utah Supreme Court discussed res judicata and/or collateral 
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estoppel as follows: 
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judgment is 
conclusive as to the parties and their privies and operates 
as a bar to any subsequent action. In order for res 
judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties 
or their privies and also the same cause of action; and this 
precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have 
been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, 
litigated in the prior action. If the subsequent suit 
involved different parties, those parties cannot be bound by 
the prior judgment.11 
"Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from a 
different cause of action and prevents parties or their 
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second 
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. This 
means that the plea of collateral estoppel can be asserted 
only against a party in the subsequent suit who was also a 
party or in privity with a party in the prior suit." 
[Emphasis added, citations omitted] 
Even though a later claim may be different than in a prior 
case, if the facts required to prove the claim in the later case 
are the same facts previously litigated, res judicata will 
operate to prevent relitigation. In Krofcheck v. Downey State 
Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978), the court applied the doctrine of 
res judicata to uphold the dismissal of a Plaintiff's action 
against an attorney based upon an alleged false affidavit where, 
in a previous case, the court had rejected the Plaintiff's 
assertation of the falsity of the attorney's affidavit as a 
defense. In Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), 
the court refused to apply the doctrine of res judicata and 
stated: 
"Accordingly, we have determined that res judicata is 
not applicable to the present case because it is based on a 
different claim, demand, or cause of action than that of the 
1967 litigation. The two causes of action rest on different 
states of"facts and evidence of a different kind of 
character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action. 
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Moreover, the evidence of the two causes of action relates 
to the status of the property in two completely different 
and separate time periods. Thus, the doctrine of res 
judicata does not apply to preclude the Plaintiff from 
maintaining his present cause of action.11 
From the foregoing, clearly res judicata is applicable to 
this case: 
a. Same parties. Although all of the parties in the James 
v. Davies case are not parties in this case, all of the parties 
in this case were also parties in the James v. Davies case and 
each were represented therein by counsel. 
h. Same issues. In their fourth cause of action in the 
James v. Davies case (R.326, 329), the Plaintiffs Apellant herein 
alleged, inter alia; 
"27. There presently exists on record certain 
protective covenants against the property contained in the 
Hi-Country Estate Subdivision. 
28. Said protective covenants are illegal and void 
because they were not properly enacted and because they are 
vague. 
29. There presently exists in record an amendment to 
the protective covenants mentioned above. 
30. Said amendment is illegal and void because it was 
not properly enacted pursuant to the terms of the original 
protective covenants and because the amendment is also 
vague. [Exhibit J to Plaintiff's Memorandum]. 
In their prayer for relief (R.331), they state: 
3. Pursuant to the Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action, 
for an order determining that the protective covenants and 
amendments thereto filed against the Hi-Country Estate 
Subdivision are unlawful and shall be removed." 
Attached to this brief as Addendum B is the Amendment to the 
Protective Covenants. Without question those covenants deal 
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specifically with the authority of the Association to levy 
assessments and to lien the property owner's land to secure 
collection of those levies, the central issue in this case. 
Even if Judge Daniels had found that the amendment had been 
improperly enacted, he could have found the covenants valid 
servitude in the property and denied the prayer for relief 
therein that the covenants "be removed". Clearly, these issues 
were litigated or should have been litigated in the James v. 
Davies case. 
c. Pinal judgment. Judge Daniels ruling, Add. A, clearly 
upheld the basic protective covenants and just as clearly struck 
down the amendment thereto. Since his judgment therein was not 
appealed, it is final and binding. 
d. Conclusion. The doctrine of res judicata should be 
applied to bar relitigation of whether or not covenants running 
with the land or equitable servitude thereto, authorize the 
Association to impose and collect assessments. 
Although the doctrine of res judicata is proper to this 
case, the Association's claim would similarly be barred by the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Searle, the court listed the 
elements of collateral estoppel as: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully and 
fairly litigated? [at J91]. 
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Analyzing this case in light of the foregoing, clearly 
requirements 2, 3 and 4 are met. Judge Daniels ruling in James 
v» Davies, Add. A, clearly indicates that the issues were 
competently, fully and fairly litigated. The basic question 
litigated in James v. Davies was what authority, if any, does the 
Association derive from covenants. Judge Daniel's ruling clearly 
indicates that he decided "none". Clearly that identical 
question is presented in this case since if the Association 
derives no authority from covenants, certainly it does not derive 
any power to make mandatory assessments. Clearly the first 
requirement for collateral estoppel has been met and application 
of the doctrine would be applicable in this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDE WHICH HAS NO APPLICATION 
TO THIS CASE. 
Judge Hanson in his memorandum decision dated November 17, 
1987, specifically ruled that; 
"Secondly, the Court having determined that the principal of 
equitable servitude applies in this case, the Plaintiff 
(Association) would be entitled to make reasonable 
assessments for expenses related to the common areas, even 
if the original covenants and purposes of the Homeowners 
Association did not allow such an assessment. (R.383). 
The Court in arriving at this conclusion based its decision 
on the doctrine of equitable servitude because, "The Defendants 
enjoy the use of the common areas and other amenities held in 
common for the subdivision." (R.382, 383). The Court admitted 
that if recovery on a theory of quantum meruit (unjust 
enrichment) was sought a trial would be necessary. (R.383 T 528 
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pg. 49 1. 11-25). 
The trial Court erred by labelling unjust enrichment or 
quantum meruit as equitable servitude in the granting of Summary 
Judgment rather than allowing Maxfield a trial. 
Covenants, conditions and restrictions which limit or 
restrict the use an owner may make of his land, as for example, 
those composed in a general plan of tract reservations, are 
sometimes referred to as negative easements. However, these are 
not true easements because they are not interests in land within 
the context of the definition of an easement. They arise by 
virtue of contract and are more properly referred to as equitable 
servitude. (Security Title, Title Standards Manual, 1700 A para. 
7, Add. C). Even when a covenant does not run with the land, 
equity will sometimes enforce the obligation by an injunction 
against breach. The burden of the covenant thus becomes an 
"equitable easement or servitude" on the land of the covenantor. 
Restatement of Property Sec. 539. The real basis for the 
enforcement of equitable servitude is the doctrine that one who 
takes land with notice of a restriction thereon cannot in equity 
and good conscience be permitted to violate that restriction. 
Brigham Young University Legal Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, 1978, Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol 1. pg. 136. 
The doctrine of equitable servitude is a restriction or 
limitation on the use of real property but by definition cannot 
create an Association or allow the Association to assess its 
members which must be created by another means. The amendment to 
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restrictive covenants that created the Association was held by 
Judge Daniels to be void because it did not have the consent of 
the equitable owners. Thus its creation was defective and cannot 
be saved by calling it an equitable servitude. Van Deusen, et 
al, v. Ruth, et al., 125 S.W.2d, (1938). 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE 
ISSUE OF THE REASONABLENESS AND NECESSITY OF ASSESSMENTS 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT. 
The trial judge awarded the Plaintiff $ 3,260.00 for 
attorney's fees jointly and severally against the Defendants when 
he granted Summary Judgment. The attorney's fees have been 
satisfied with the exception of $815.00 which the Association is 
seeking against Maxfield. 
The general rule is that attorney's fees are recoverable if 
provided for by either contract or statute. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co 
v, Winburn Title Mfg. Co. 461 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 1972). The 
Utah Supreme Court has followed that rule since at least 1953. 
Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Ut. 16, 27, 253 P.2d 372, 377 (1953). 
Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 P.2d 667 (Ut. 1982). An 
award of contractually based attorney's fees must be based on a 
valid contract and incurred in the enforcement of express 
contractual covenants. Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498f 499 (Utah 
1976). Since there was no contract or statutory basis for 
attorney's fees and no exception could be found for awarding 
attorney's fees under an equitable servitude doctrine, an award 
of attorney's fees is without basis and in error. 
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Judge Hanson admitted that if the assessments were 
recoverable under an unjust enrichment (quantum meruit) theory a 
trial would be necessary to determine if the charges were 
necessary and reasonable. (T. 528 pg. 49 1. 11-21). Since this 
is the only theory that a Summary Judgment could have been 
awardedf Maxfield should have been allowed to try the matter on 
these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The Summary Judgment entered by the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, should be set aside and judgment entered in favor of 
Maxfield, no cause of action, on the grounds and for the reasons 
that the Association's cause of action is barred because of res 
judicata and/or collateral estoppel by Judge Daniel's decision in 
Richard L. James, et al, v. John W. Davies, et al., Case No, C81-
8560, or in the alternative the case should be remanded to the 
trial court for trial to determine if under a theory of quantum 
meruit (unjust enrichment) the Association is entitled to recover 
and if so whether the assessments are reasonable and necessary 
with an instruction to the trial court that the Association is 
not entitled to attorney's fees as they are not provided by 
contract or statute and for Maxfield's cost of appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this Jj%^ day of July, 1989. 
JOMTO-B. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Appellant, Maxfield 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
M'AYK OV U'l.Mi 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
RICHARD L. JAMES, ET. AL. , 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
v s . 
JOHN W. DAVIES, ET. AL. , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
C i v i l No. C - 8 1 - 8 5 6 0 
COURT'S RULING 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
ry 
24 
25 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of February, 
1984, m the above-entitled court at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m. the abovs-entitied 
matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Scott Daniels 
sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings were 
had. 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs; 
For the Defendants 
R. Clark Arnold. Esq. 
Lowe & Arnold 
Valley Tower, Fourth Floor 
50 Wesc Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Con Kostopulo^, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1095 East 2100 South, Suite 235 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84106 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
l
'.~
R
 -Q...C. •'•; Jv._r>. : N c s 
Ui.xcrorpi of pro..-i;, ci r.r.r,) 
Till. CVliT: Th..s j..: tlu: ca.se of KichorJ L. .Ja.-.e* 
and others verses John W. Davics and others, C-81-8560. 
First cause of action related to tnc election and 
it was dismissed. 
The second cause of action related to the election 
of officers, and it was also dismissed. 
The third cau:,e of action relays to authority to 
enforce the covenants. 
As I have read the covenants in light of the 
testimony that's been presented. I'm of the opinion that the 
type of horneownership that the Homeowners Association has 
is not a type of horneownership or land ownership contemplated 
in the restrictive covenants and rule that the Homeowners 
Association has no authority-to enforce the restrictive 
covenants. 
On the fourth cause of action, the first portion 
relating to the covenants themselves was dismissed. 
The second relating to the amendment, I think I'm 
compelled to rule that the amendment was not properly enacted. 
First of all i
 j u s t c a n. t r e a U y r e a d t h e r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t Jj 
themselves in
 S U ch a way as to allow amendment before the 
expiration of that term in 1995. But even if there were 
so,n« uetnod to do that, I think it requires the consent of 
the equitable owners of the property. So on either ground 
I rule that the amendment is not properly enacted; it is 
void. 
The fifth cause of action relatir.c; to the ability 
of the homeowners ASSUIJI a t ior. to appeal and present, its vu-us L 
the zoning actions, I've read the eases cited ar.J the rule 
cited, and I'm of the opinion that based upon the language in 
the articles of incorporation, the Homeowners Association 
does not have the right to hear zoning hearings. 
On the sixth cause of action which relates to ultra 
vires as well as I find as a matter of fact that there were 
no funds used of the Homeowners Association used to prosecute 
actions to enforce the covenants. Therefore, I rule for the 
Defendants on that particular claim. 
The third part of the sixth cause of action relating 
to the elections is moot and is dismissed based upon the 
fact that the first cause of actions were dismissed because 
of the election question I find to be moot. 
I do find that the directors acted in an ultra vires 
matter in attempting to enforce the restrictive covenants. 
And I suppose the issue of judgement they can't do that, but 
I really find no damages in that respect since they didn't 
use any Homeowner. Association funds. 
I think that the action was prosecuted on both sid£s 
in good faith and both sides honestly felt they had a 
legitimate position to take and do not. feel that attorney lees 
are appropriately awarded to either side in this case. And 
Really since I ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on some of 
the issues and in favor for the defendants on others, it's 
difficult 10 £3s h^w there's a prevalent party, and therefore, 
award no costs. 
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Now. did I cover everything or die I Jeavo somethinq 
out ? 
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"". ARKOLD: No. your Hor.OJ . j u s t c l a r i f y 3 n y Qp ^ 
judgement.
 T h c J u d g e m o n t Woul<J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
order would issue against enforcement of the covenants? 
THE COURT: I think that's probably appropriate. 
Any problem with the fnrm r - ,-u *. 
une lorra or that procedure? 
MR. KOSTOPULOS: No, yOUr Honor. 
,,,,/vJ The only additional question I might ask, the Court 
may decline to respond, it being no, p«rhap3 properly before 
the Court at the
 p r e s u n t t i m e i s t h i S ; Ifl ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J 
has ruled that the amendment to the covenants is invalid in 
as far as it being improperly enacted and in as much as the 
amendment to the covenants is the source of mandatory membershijp 
in the association itself, and in as much as we are coming 
UP very quickly to the February 28th anual meeting of the 
association. I wonder if-the Court would address the issue 
of whether or not that meeting should go forth or if there's 
any point in doing anything with it or whether the association 
should simply be dissolved at this point?. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm
 Cf the opinion that the amend-
ment was improperly enacted which seems to be the source of 
jmandatory participation in the association. I don't see any 
tefcson why the association can't continue to hold its meetings 
do what it wants to tfe, *3vfc5 £ V s h £ e l i p e Q p i e .f t h e y ^ ^ 
be members, they can't drive on the roads or something. But 
as I read the documents, I just see ao - I just cannot come 
to the conclusion that that amendment was validly enacted. 
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And I don't know if I can toll you what the next step is. I 
redlly don't think it was --
MR. ARNOLD: I will prepare the findings. 
THE COURT: Would you submit those to Mr. Kostopulos? 
MR. ARNOLD: I will. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Again, I appreciate tl.e 
way it was handled. It was a vary well tried case and the 
areas that were submitted were presented very well. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
c E R T .I F J „ C A T E 
^i'/v:"i uv UTAII ) 
COU::TV OF SALT LAKI: ) 
I , Susan S. Sprouse, do hereby c e r t i f y t h a t 
I am a C e r t i f i e d Shorthand Reporter and Notary P u b l i c in 
and for the S t a t e of Utah; 
That as such Repor ter . I a t t e n d e d the hea r ing 
of the foregoing m a t t e r and t h e r e a f t e r r e p o r t e d in Stenotype 
a l l of the tes t imony and proceedings had f and caused s a i d 
notes to be t r a n s c r i b e d i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g , and the foregoing 
pages numbered from 2 t o 5 i n c l u s i v e , c o n s t i t u t e a f u l l , 
t r u e , and c o r r e c t r e p o r t of the same. 
DATED a t S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah, t h i s 23rd day of 
February, 1984. 
Susan S, Sprouse , CSR/RPR 
My commission e x p i r e s : 
November 1987 
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ADDENDUM B 
AMENDMENT TO 
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR HI-COUNTRY ESTATES, 
LOCATED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
PHASE I. 
This Amendment of Protective Covenants for Hi-Country Estate, 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Phase 1, by the under-
signed, beim record owners of more than three-fourths in area of 
the -property located within Hi-Ccuntry Estates, hereinafter called 
the "Declarants"; 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Declarants executing this amendment are the owners of 
record of more than three-fourths in area of the Lots contained 
in Hi-Country Estates, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Phase I.; and 
WHEREAS, Declarants executing this amendment desire to amend 
the Protective Covenants by adding thereto the provisions hereinafter 
contained; 
UOW, THEREFORE, Declarants executing this amendment hereby 
subject said property to the covenants, restrictions and con-
ditions previously in affect, together with this amendment thereto, 
and the acceptance of any deed or conveyance thereof by the Granc.-a 
or Grantees therein and their, and each of their heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns, shall constitute their 
covenant and agreement with the declarants and with each other, to 
accept and hold the property described or conveyed in or by such 
deed or conveyance, subject*to such covenants, restrictions and 
conditions, with the following amendment, as follows, to-wit: 
ARTICLE III. 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMON AREAS 
1. Homeowners Association. Hi-Country Estates, Inc., will 
form or cause to oe formed a non-profit corporation or association 
for the purpose of maintaining and providing for the common arsar, 
including roads and streets, and each lot owner or owners will be 
members of such association. Persons or entities purchasing a 
lot under a contract shall be deemed the owner of such lot for the 
purpose of membership in the association. 
2. Assessment for Maintenance of Road, Street and Other PiAllc 
Services. Eacn Grantee and lot owner for himseif, his heirs, 
executors, and assigns, covenants and agrees to pay annually hi* 
pro-rata share of the cost to maintain the roads, streets and 
common areas, including, but not limited to, the common areas set 
aside for the delivery and pickup of mail, the pickup of children 
for school by school buses and other vehicles, and an area for o 
garbage collection. Grantee's assessment in this regard shall hi -* 
paid promptly when the same becomes due as provided in the By-Laws £a 
of the Homeowners Association, and of the Grantees failure to pa/ £» 
same promptly when due shall constitute a lien upon the owners* *"* 
i 
y 
premises and the sane ray be enforced in equity or at law as in the* 
case of any l.en foreclosure. Such annual assessment snail not 
commence until January 1, 1973, and the first assessment shall be 
in the amount of $35,00 por lot ewnee, said amount to be placed in 
an account and to be u-sed exclusively by tr.e Hcreowners Association 
for tne purccses hereinabove mentioned, and for sucn other servient 
as are deerec important to the development ai.d preservation of an 
attractive community and to furtner maintain the privacy and general 
safety of the residential '-immunities located in hi-Country Estates, 
Frcn-mnd after January 1, 1974, the annual payment may be increasei 
each year up to five (Z) percent of the maximum authorised payment 
for the previous year. The Homeowners Association is ooligated tc 
provide maintenance and all otner services statea aoove only to the* 
extent that sjen maintenance and services can be provided with the 
proceeds of Sv-cn annual payments. Tha foraccmg annual fee may b«. 
increased by an arount greater than five (5) percent of the mai:ir..^ a 
authorized payment for the previous year, by the written consent of 
a ma^or^ty of the lot owners. At sue: .ime as any public body siid.i 
undertake to -amta.nthe roads and stilts ana provide the other 
services contamo.atej nerein, this covenant snail cease, terminate, 
and be held :cr naught. 
3. Extortions of ^cads and Common ^reas. Hi-Country Estates 
Tic. , reserves t.ie r-gnt to extend tr.e roac system into property 
ai]oir.uig 4i-Cc^ntry Estates, and to plat additional subdivision 
areas wuci «c:ld be an extension of the road system and common 
areas as ccntr-olated herein. Should sucn extension ta>ce effect, 
the lot owners within the ac^oinmg suodivisions shall be required 
tc become mercers of the Homeowners Association as contemciatec 
herein and tt pay tneir pro-r3ta share of tne cost. 
4. Cff jjt of * -p-dm^t. Eac* and ever; other restriction a. d 
covenant conca...ea i- tne Protective Covenants are heresy reaff-r~ed 
as heremaoove mcdifiec and amended. 
DATE3 this 6tn day of .April # 1973. 
V • 
t :V ^^Cor*7oxatc Seal} 
... [ Secifet^ry 
President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: S 3 . 
Co* Uy of Salt Lake) 
/ 
On the -•"• day of April . 1973, pi rsonally appeared before me 
CHAFM.FS E. t.EWTON and D. K A E T H SPE\?CER who being by me duly 
sworn did sny, each 1'or himselT, thai he t|-»e said Charles . . . Lewton 
is the president *nd he, the said D. Kteth Spencer is the secretary of 
iii-CCUMTRY ES7A • 'CS. INC, and that the witnin und foregoing instru-
ment was signed in behal ' of ja id rorporatiun by authority of a resolution 
of its Board of Directors and said Charles E. Lewton and D. Kteth Spencer-
each duly acknowledged to m : that said corporation executed the same and 
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
/ 
7 ~ - \ '.... ,.
 # NOTARY PUBLIC 
• ^ V^v*nrm*si'u/i Expires: Residing at: 
••.. •• r • 
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tMOtntnio 
17.00 IN GENERAL 
A. Definitions, Characteristics, Distinctions 
1. Easement 
An easement is an interest in land of another which 
entitles its owner to a limited use and enjoyment of 
the land in which the interest exists. 
a. It must be created and transferred subject to 
the rules of real property. 
b. It constitutes an encumbrance on anothers land, 
hence, an owner of land cannot be the owner of 
an easement over it. 
c. It is a limited and a non-possessory interest 
which restricts the owner to that dominion and 
control necessary to the enjoyment of his 
interest. The owner of an easement has no 
interest which he can assert against third 
persons unless they are interfering with his 
enjoyment of the easement. 
2. Designation of lands benefitted or encumbered by 
easements. 
a. Dominant Tenement 
The land benefitted by and to which an easement 
is attached is called the dominant tenement. 
b. Servient Tenement 
The land upon which a burden or servitude is 
created or imposed is called the servient 
tenement. 
3. Right of Way 
A right of way is a privilege to pass over the land 
of another for a particular and expressly stated 
purpose. It 1s an easement. However the words 
"right of way" are susceptible to ambiguity. They 
are sometimes used to describe a right or an in-
terest in land; or they are sometimes used to des-
cribe a strip of land over which the easement passes. 
A right of way may attach to and be incidental to 
the use of a parcel of land, or, it may attach to 
and benefit an Individual Independent of his owner-
ship of land. 
4. License 
A license is a personal privilege, terminable at 
will, to do some act or acts upon the land of 
c/otntNia 
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another which is not an interest in land and which 
is not required to be created in the form or in the 
manner of a conveyance. 
Rule of Title Practice 
A recorded license shall be shown as an encumbrance 
on the property it burdens. However, it is not a 
proper interest to be insured by a policy of title 
insurance. 
5. Profit a Prendre 
A profit a prendre is a right to remove a part of 
the soil or a product from the soil such as water, 
wood, minerals, oil and gas from the land of another. 
Historically, it does not involve a use of land. 
However, the owner of a profit has a right to enter 
upon land and do whatever is reasonably necessary in 
the exercise of his right to a profit. 
6. Natural Rights 
There are certain rights and interests in land which 
are not created by conveyance or contract which 
benefit one parcel of land and burden another parcel 
which are not easements. They are natural property 
rights which are incidental to land ownership. 
These attach to and pass with transfers of the soil 
but they are never insured nor are they ever reflected 
as encumbrances in evidences of title. These include 
the following: 
a. The right of a land owner to have surface water 
flow without obstruction from his land in its 
natural state "as it is wont to flow" over the 
land of a lower owner. 
b. The right of a land owner to receive lateral 
support from his neighbor's land for the preservation 
of his land in its natural state. 
c. The right of an owner to enjoy the occupancy 
and use of his land free from unreasonable 
sights, sounds and smells occasioned by a 
neighbor's use of his land. 
7. Equitable Servitudes 
Covenants, conditions and restrictions which limit 
or restrict the use an owner may make of his land, 
as for example, those imposed in a general plan of 
3-1-75 -2-
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tract restrictions, are sometimes referred to as 
negative easements. However, these are not true 
easements because they are not interests in land 
within the context of the definition of an easement. 
They arise by virtue of contract and are more prop-
erly referred to as equitable servitudes. 
B. Classification of Easements 
!• Appurtenant Easement 
An easement is appurtenant to land when it is created 
to benefit, and does benefit, the owner of a dominant 
tenement in his use of his land. 
For example: A, owner of lots 1 and 2, conveys lot 
2 to B "together with and as appurtenant to lot 2 a 
non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over 
the northerly 40 feet of Lot 1". 
The easement constitutes an encumbrance on Lot 1 
(servient tenement) for the benefit of the owner of 
lot 2 (dominant tenement). 
2. Easement in Gross 
An easement is in gross when it is not created to 
benefit or does not benefit a grantee in the use or 
enjoyment of his land. In this instance the ease-
ment attached to the person instead of to other 
land. Hence, there is no dominant tenement. 
For examDle: A, owner of lot 1, grants to Pacific 
Gas and Electric Co. and easement for pole line over 
the rear 5 feet of lot 1. 
The easement constitutes an encumbrance on Lot 1 
(servient tenement). However, it does not benefit 
land owned by the grantee. 
C. Determining Whether Easement is Appurtenant or in Gross 
For title insurance purposes 1t is essential that a 
recorded easement be identified as either one appurtenant 
or as one in gross, and, if it is appurtenant, the dominant 
tenement must be identified. Procedures to be followed 
in examining, reporting, and insuring easements are 
dependent upon establishing these factors. 
In many instances the documents creating an easement 
3-1-75 .3-
